Science and Buddhism
Science and Buddhism in Collected Works, volume II (1906); the work is dated 1903. Source and original. Public domain.
Science and Buddhism is Crowley's argument for treating Buddhist doctrines and meditation as subjects of investigation. Dated 1903, the essay appears in Collected Works, volume II (1906), pp. 244–261, with a dedication to Thomas Henry Huxley. It combines a comparison of ideas, an account of meditative experience and an appeal for organised research. Its claim that Buddhism is scientific is Crowley's historical argument, rather than a statement that every Buddhist doctrine has been established by modern science.1)
The comparison Crowley proposes
The opening gives both terms a deliberately broad meaning. Crowley's “science” includes metaphysical questions; his “Buddhism” includes meditation as well as propositions about the world. He proposes to distinguish essential claims from what he regards as later accretions, fantastic narrative and misleading interpretations. The result is a selective reconstruction of Buddhism for the purposes of his argument.2)
He rejects the authority of a speaker as a sufficient test of truth. A claim does not become true because the Buddha made it, nor false because someone else did. At the same time, the essay is openly partisan: it attacks Theosophical interpretations and attempts to make Buddhist teachings conform to Christian expectations. Its tone belongs to a debate over who has the right to interpret religious traditions.
Huxley's importance is consequently more than honorary. Crowley uses the prestige and language of critical inquiry to address readers who might dismiss meditation before investigating it. He also asks Buddhist readers to accept criticism of inherited explanations. The proposed alliance places demands on both groups.
Sorrow, change and the problem of a permanent self
The essay discusses the Four Noble Truths, the Three Characteristics, the Ten Fetters and karma. These provide the sequence of claims Crowley wants to examine. In his presentation, sorrow is tied to desire, while change makes the effort to preserve a fixed condition continually unstable. His examples move from human necessities to much broader speculation about natural processes.3)
That movement needs careful reading. When Crowley extends desire and possible suffering to molecular processes, he explicitly acknowledges leaving the domain of fact. An article about his essay should preserve that distinction rather than presenting the comparison as an established scientific result.
The discussion of the self similarly turns attention from a supposed unchanging owner of experience to the changing phenomena through which a person is known. Memory does not supply an uncomplicated proof of permanence, since memory itself can be unreliable. Western philosophical references and Buddhist terminology are made to address a common question: what warrants the assertion of a stable entity behind changing experience?
Meditation and the relative reality of experience
Section VII asks how ordinary consciousness should judge an unfamiliar state. Crowley argues that the inability of an untrained observer to experience something immediately does not by itself disprove it. In his account, the investigator must prepare the mind that will serve as the instrument of observation.4)
He describes concentration as involving both sustained attention and watchfulness for distraction. The reported result concerns a change in the relation between subject and object, accompanied by bliss. He wishes to treat this as a phenomenon requiring investigation before drawing a final metaphysical conclusion from it.
The essay's terminology also has a history. In the main text Crowley distinguishes his experience of dhyāna from samādhi, which he says he has not experienced. A footnote dated 1906 revises that assessment and identifies the experiences as samādhi. The collected printing therefore preserves a change of interpretation within the work itself. It should not be cited as though every statement belonged unchanged to 1903.5)
Suggestion and the proposed research method
Crowley identifies a difficulty in telling an investigator what an experience should look like:
For did I say that such and such a practice leads one to see a blue pig, the suggestion is sufficient to cause one class of people to see a blue pig where none existed, and another to deny or suspect the blue pig when it really appeared, though the latter alternative is unlikely.
— Aleister Crowley, Science and Buddhism.6)
The two proposed effects run in opposite directions: an expectation can encourage a report, while suspicion of that expectation can discourage one. Crowley does not give both possibilities equal weight, and the quotation preserves his qualification. His decision to withhold details is an attempted response to that problem, not a demonstration that suggestion has been eliminated. The passage makes the communication of results part of the inquiry’s design.
The later appeal asks for the reported experience to become an independently investigated phenomenon:
Very well! but I want this formula verified a hundred times, a thousand times, by independent investigators. I want it better stated; its conditions modified, defined exactly.
— Aleister Crowley, Science and Buddhism.7)
“Better stated” and “conditions modified” go beyond repeating the author’s conclusion. They leave room for changing the description as well as varying what is done. Crowley then warns against constructing a whole philosophy from one experience. Read together, these statements distinguish a research proposal, its eventual results and a metaphysical interpretation of those results. The essay argues for that progression; it does not itself supply the completed series of investigations.
This is an important connection with Scientific Illuminism. It is also a limitation of the essay: a proposal for repeated investigation is not itself evidence that those investigations have occurred or confirmed all the proposed conclusions.
Observation rather than concentration on one object
The section headed Mahasatipatthana describes a different approach from holding the mind to a single object. Attention follows bodily and mental events, while the wording of observation avoids assuming an “I” behind them. Crowley then describes analysis through bodily form, sensation, perception, tendencies and consciousness.8)
His grammatical examples matter to the argument. An event can be noted as occurring without immediately attributing it to a permanent owner. The aim, in his account, is for an analysis first reached through reasoning to become an immediate way of apprehending experience.
Here Crowley also identifies the limits of his evidence. He says that he has not devoted himself seriously to the complete practice and that his account of its later development proceeds from reasoning rather than completed personal experience. This qualification should accompany the confident language elsewhere in the essay. It separates a proposed progression from an attainment he claims to have verified.
Community, reform and historical context
The final sections call for cooperation between Buddhist practitioners and scientific investigators. Crowley interprets the Three Refuges as encouragement from an earlier successful seeker, confidence in an intelligible order, and support from a community engaged in the work. The Sangha is presented as a remedy for the discouragement of isolated effort.9)
The essay is also a reforming polemic. Its sweeping claims about religious populations, historical progress and the superiority of particular intellectual traditions belong to its early twentieth-century setting. They should be distinguished from its more specific methodological questions about observation, suggestion and inference.
Allan Bennett / Ananda Metteyya, whose explanation of the Four Noble Truths Crowley cites, supplies an important personal and intellectual connection. The work predates the 1904 reception of Liber AL, while its concerns continue in The Soldier and the Hunchback, Book 4 and Eight Lectures on Yoga. These later works should be compared with it rather than read backwards into every sentence.
Video: Crowley and Theravada Buddhism
Ryuei Michael McCormick, introduced by the channel as a priest in the Nichiren Buddhist tradition, compares Crowley's Thelema and magick with Theravada Buddhism in this lecture from 25 October 2016. Its broader comparative subject provides context for the essay's engagement with Buddhist ideas. The speaker's comparison complements the article's account of Crowley's historical argument and selective use of Buddhist teachings.
Aleister Crowley & Theravada Buddhism
Aleister Crowley & Theravada Buddhism — Blazing Star O.T.O.; 1:32:27. Watch on YouTube.
